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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in compliance with paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 975 (1995) of 30 January 1995, by which the Council requested me to submit a progress report on the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) by 15 April 1995. As required, it apprises the Council of the modalities of the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH.

2. It will be recalled that in resolution 975 (1995), the Security Council authorized me to recruit and deploy military contingents, civilian police and other civilian personnel sufficient to allow UNMIH to assume the full range of its functions as established by resolution 867 (1993) and as revised and extended by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 940 (1994). The Council further authorized me, in coordination with the Commander of the multinational force, to take the necessary steps in order for UNMIH to assume these responsibilities as soon as possible, with full transfer of responsibilities from the multinational force to UNMIH to be completed by 31 March 1995.

3. On 31 March 1995, the official ceremony of transfer of responsibilities from the multinational force to UNMIH took place at the National Palace at Port-au-Prince. It was attended, inter alia, by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti, President William J. Clinton of the United States of America, the President of the Security Council and myself. The spirit on this occasion highlighted the excellent working relations existing between the multinational force and UNMIH, in particular the effective cooperation between the United States authorities and the United Nations.

4. My short visit to Haiti on this occasion gave me a good opportunity to observe the beginning of the operation of UNMIH and to exchange views with the President of Haiti on the political situation in the country, on security-related matters, on the efforts to rehabilitate the economy and on the process of national reconciliation. Discussions with my Special Representative, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the Commander of the military component of UNMIH, Major-General Joseph Kinzer, and the Commander of the civilian police component of UNMIH, Chief Superintendent Neil Pouliot, confirmed that the environment

prevailing in the country with respect to security and stability was such as to allow for the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH in accordance with Security Council resolutions 940 (1994) and 975 (1995).

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

5. As UNMIH begins to discharge its duties more than five months after the return of President Aristide, the situation in Haiti is different from the one in September 1994 when the multinational force was deployed. The presence of the multinational force has brought more stable conditions and restored reasonable normality to the life of the population. The present political situation is characterized by wide popular support for President Aristide and few human rights violations. At the same time, there are major institutional weaknesses and growing - and potentially worrying - frustrations over the slow pace of economic recovery.

6. Haiti has been without a Parliament since 4 February 1995, when the mandates of all the members of the Chamber of Deputies and two thirds of the Senators expired. A presidential order of 25 February 1995 authorized the Minister of the Interior to extend the mandate of elected officials at the local level or to replace them with new interim officials.

7. As regards the judiciary, a number of judges, as well as the Chief Prosecutor in Port-au-Prince, have been replaced. The Minister of Justice recently announced an increase in the salaries of judicial personnel in order to encourage them to improve their performance. A National Commission for Truth and Justice was inaugurated in my presence on 30 March 1995. It is responsible for investigating human rights violations committed under the military authorities after the military coup d'état of September 1991.

8. A new Minister of the Interior, Mr. M. Beaubrun, was appointed on 23 February 1995. Subsequently, the Minister was alleged to have been involved in the assassination on 28 March of Mme. M. Durocher-Bertin, a well-known lawyer and prominent critic of President Aristide. These allegations, which have been widely reported by the Haitian and international press, are being investigated, at the request of President Aristide, with the assistance of United States specialists. The Government announced on 6 April 1995 the creation of a commission of five interim police officers to investigate recent murders, including that of Mme. Durocher-Bertin. Investigations will also be re-opened on murders committed under the military regime, such as the assassinations of President Aristide's aide Antoine Izmery, former Justice Minister Guy Malary and Father Jean-Marie Vincent. Furthermore, the Government has launched a mobilization campaign called "justice for all", which aims at encouraging the population to testify in court in cases of assassination of Haitian citizens.

III. ECONOMIC SITUATION

9. The political changes have created high expectations for swift economic recovery. During my recent visit, I again noted the tremendous economic challenges that persist in Haiti. The extreme poverty and high unemployment

prevailing in much of the country require sustained international attention. Private and public investments are urgently needed to stimulate the economy, which suffers from a lack of basic infrastructure and high unemployment. Electricity shortages continue to be a hindrance to industrial revival.

10. It will be recalled that the meeting of multilateral agencies and donors held in Paris in January 1995 resulted in commitments of close to US$ 900 million for an aid and reconstruction package for Haiti over the next 12 to 18 months. Although such commitments reflect the confidence of the international community in the future of Haiti, the country's absorptive capacity continues to be quite modest. Only scattered evidence exists on the evolution of the economy. Recovery signals are still weak, inflation is comparatively high and unemployment remains a major economic, social and political problem.

11. The Haitian public expected that the return of President Aristide would bring a rapid improvement of their standard of living. This is unlikely to happen any time soon, and it is symptomatic that the Government was recently criticized during small-scale popular demonstrations in Cap Haïtien and Port-au-Prince and that its members have been blamed for unemployment and the high cost of living. It is to be hoped that the forthcoming elections will encourage international investors to pay more attention to the country's long-term development needs. However, perceptions of the public security situation seem at present to be impeding foreign investment.

IV. SECURITY SITUATION

12. The issue of security is central to the entire United Nations operation in Haiti. The decision of the Security Council to deploy UNMIH rested on the assumption that in the context of resolution 975 (1995), the Haitian authorities would be capable of maintaining a secure environment, with the assistance of UNMIH. However, while very few human rights violations have been reported during the last two months, crime remains at a high level by Haitian standards and a sense of insecurity prevails.

13. During my meetings with President Aristide on 30 and 31 March, I reiterated the importance of enabling the interim Haitian police to enforce law and order, in which task they would be assisted by the UNMIH civilian police (CIVPOL). Unfortunately, their capacity still remains highly questionable. A functioning police force will be particularly important at the time of the elections, which could be negatively affected by a lack of adequate law enforcement. In addition, it is clear that the absence of effective policing will permit a further rise in common crime.

14. The beginning of March was marked by a significant increase in crime, including numerous murders in Port-au-Prince which were directly attributable to the activities of vigilante elements. However, such activities have declined in recent weeks. There were 3 reported "vigilante killings" during the period from 4 to 11 April, compared to approximately 10 during the period from 17 to 31 March and 26 during the period from 10 to 16 March. Efforts to educate the population on the law and the rights of citizens through public information

campaigns will be intensified, especially as regards the legal consequences of vigilante actions.

15. The violence, together with the shortcomings of the Interim Public Security Force, have led to concern that UNMIH, operating without enforcement authority, will not prove as effective as the multinational force, whose mandate included enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. This concern is echoed in certain sectors of the Haitian population. There are also indications that disruptive elements might try to test the resolve of UNMIH to fulfil its mandate, although at present there is no confirmed threat to UNMIH. Overall, it is anticipated that the level of direct threat to UNMIH will remain low, but the possibility of incidents during routine operations should not be underestimated.

16. My Special Representative and the Commanders of the military and CIVPOL components of UNMIH are prepared to meet these challenges. The Force Commander has received assertive rules of engagement and the CIVPOL Commander has received proactive operation guidelines. Effective coordination has been established between contingents with respect to security preparations, and it is possible to be reasonably confident that they will be able to cope with the problems that may arise.

V. HAITIAN POLICE

17. On 3 February 1995, President Aristide inaugurated a new Police Academy, and a first group of 375 cadets started a four-month training programme. A second group of 375 trainees began their studies on 13 March.

18. Discussions are taking place within the Government and between the Government and UNMIH on the best procedure for moving forward from the present unsatisfactory situation to the full deployment of a functional National Police able to carry out its duties effectively. Because of its continuing bilateral programme for the formation of the National Police at the Police Academy, the Government of the United States is taking part in these discussions.

19. When the first class of Academy graduates is ready to be deployed in June 1995, the National Police will still be a long way from the minimum of 7,000 police agents needed to keep law and order in the country. Members of the Interim Public Security Force, who number fewer than 3,000, will therefore still be needed and will have to be encouraged and motivated to do their work. At the present time, they remain unmotivated and many are regarded as lacking basic police skills. They have yet to receive vehicles and communications and other basic equipment. Delays in the payment of their salaries are contributing to low morale, as are uncertainties about their future.

20. Proposals presented by the joint United Nations/United States working committee on the Haitian police for the future of the Interim Public Security Force have not yet been accepted by the Haitian authorities, and there are indications that the Force could be demobilized as soon as cadets of the new National Police start to graduate from the Academy. At this time, there are no programmes in place to absorb members of the Interim Public Security Force in

alternative civilian employment. This is likely to undermine further their morale and their willingness to continue to serve in the Force, at a time when it is critically needed.

21. It will be recalled that pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 975 (1995) a United Nations fund was established to enable Member States to make voluntary contributions to support the international police monitoring programme and assist with the creation of an adequate police force in Haiti. On 24 March 1995, the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations informed me that his Government had decided to contribute US$ 3 million to this fund. I encourage other Governments to consider supporting this crucial aspect of Haitian institution-building by contributing to the fund.

VI. ELECTIONS

22. The parliamentary and local elections, which were initially scheduled to take place on 4 and 25 June 1995, will face a number of technical challenges. All 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 18 of 27 seats in the Senate and approximately 2,200 state and local seats will be contested. A strong political will by all participants in the electoral process, led by the Provisional Electoral Council, will be required to meet these challenges. The registration of candidates will test the determination of the political parties to take part in the race. It is hoped that the registration of voters, which had a slow start, will accelerate to reach 1990 levels. The existence of a secure environment remains a major precondition for a free and fair electoral campaign and a reasonable turnout of voters on election day.

23. President Aristide told me on 30 March that he plans to continue his meetings with the leaders of political parties and members of the Provisional Electoral Council. At the last such meeting, on 6 April 1995, which President Aristide arranged and attended, it was announced that the elections would now take place on 25 June, with the second round on 16 July. Although unfortunate, this postponement is not a major setback. For one thing, it will give the Provisional Electoral Council more breathing space, since its members were working on a very tight schedule. More importantly, the decision to postpone the elections is a goodwill gesture by the Council to the political parties. Dialogue between the Council and the parties, as well as amongst the parties themselves, should now continue with a view to achieving the political consensus needed to enhance the benefits and the credibility of the electoral process.

24. Further to a request by the Government of Haiti, the United Nations is providing technical assistance on electoral matters. A 17-person Electoral Assistance Team is currently active throughout the country at the departmental level, helping the Provisional Electoral Council to set up an adequate infrastructure to carry out the plan for the registration of voters and candidates. Recently, the Electoral Assistance Team participated actively in the transportation of registration material down to the commune level. The multinational force and UNMIH assisted in this operation.

25. The International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) will support the election process by monitoring the human rights aspects of the campaign, in

particular the unrestricted exercise of the freedoms of expression and association. It will do this through civic education programmes; observing campaign rallies; promoting a climate of tolerance; monitoring and reporting on the political climate of the campaign and assisting in resolving differences; and investigating allegations of intimidation or violence related to the elections and the electoral campaign. The Organization of American States (OAS) will carry out its responsibility for the observation of the elections through personnel deployed by it in Haiti. These functions will include recruitment and organization of the work of international observers. MICIVIH, UNMIH and other United Nations agencies in Haiti will be asked to support the observation efforts of OAS, both through the participation of some of their officers as volunteer observers and through the provision of logistic support to the extent possible within existing budget provisions. It is hardly necessary to add that the forthcoming elections are essential for the normalization of the situation in Haiti and for the long-term democratic process.

VII. TRANSITION FROM THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

26. The transition from the multinational force to UNMIH took place on 31 March 1995, in full compliance with the timetable envisaged in my report of 17 January 1995 (S/1995/46, paras. 76 and 77).

27. On 7 February 1995, I met with my Special Representative and with the commanders of the military and CIVPOL components of UNMIH to finalize certain issues relevant to the forthcoming transition. On the same day, all three met with representatives of the troop- and CIVPOL-contributing countries and briefed them on the mandate of the Mission, force structure, concepts of operations, rules of engagement and CIVPOL operational guidelines. As mentioned in my report of 17 January 1995, UNMIH will undertake tasks originally entrusted to it by the Security Council in its resolutions 867 (1993) and 940 (1994). The information in paragraphs 64 to 69 of the above-mentioned report concerning the rules of engagement of UNMIH, the structure of its military component and its deployment and concept of operations remains relevant.

28. It became possible to effect the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH on 31 March in an orderly manner based on the following factors:

(a) The work undertaken by the UNMIH advance team in developing the concept of operations, force structure and deployment plans had been thorough. For five months the advance team had conducted air and ground reconnaissance of the country, developed the structure of UNMIH, analysed the threat situation, developed the concept of logistics and communications support, maintained liaison with the headquarters of the multinational force and planned the transition. The advance team members also coordinated the reception and orientation of the contingents that were not already part of the multinational force (Argentina, Canada, Honduras, India, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Suriname) and received and oriented the staff of the Force headquarters as they arrived in late February and in March. The timely decision of the Security Council to increase the strength of the advance team up to 500 personnel to facilitate the planning of UNMIH, to identify the conditions required for the

transition and to prepare the actual deployment of UNMIH produced positive results. The military and police personnel of the advance team managed to conduct thorough on-site planning of the new Mission and to assess its equipment and personnel requirements. The team's administrative staff established the necessary logistical infrastructure;

(b) Prior to the transition, 70 per cent of the military component of UNMIH, including the Quick Reaction Force and Special Forces elements, had been deployed in Haiti under the multinational force. This provided for the required operational continuity;

(c) The conduct of a six-day integrated staff training exercise in early March benefited the military and civilian staff of UNMIH headquarters and helped them to understand the responsibilities, capabilities, limitations and operational concepts of the various components. The training enabled participants to gain the required knowledge of Haiti and to become acquainted with United Nations peace-keeping principles, rules and procedures;

(d) Finally, two tripartite meetings (bringing together the Government of Haiti, the multinational force command and the United Nations) helped to "synchronize watches" before the transition. Frank and open discussions during these meetings clearly established that UNMIH was well prepared for the transition and that there would be no marked decrease in military capabilities following the transfer of command. Questions relating to security, the forthcoming elections, rehabilitation of the justice and penitentiary systems and the revival of the economy were addressed in detail.

29. Numerous other discussions held virtually until 31 March 1995 in Port-au-Prince, Washington and New York between the Government of Haiti, the multinational force, the United Nations Secretariat, the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti and other interested parties helped to assure the smooth transition and deployment of UNMIH. Working groups composed of the Government of Haiti and UNMIH, together with representatives of the United States, continue to discuss matters related to the Haitian police and the justice system. My Special Representative, the Force Commander and the CIVPOL Commander hold weekly meetings with President Aristide on all relevant matters. My Special Representative also meets regularly with Prime Minister Michel, the Chief of President Aristide's Cabinet, Mr. Voltaire, and the President of the Provisional Electoral Council.

30. In paragraph 7 of resolution 940 (1994), the Security Council decided that the tasks of the UNMIH advance team, including a group of observers, would expire on the date of termination of the mission of the multinational force. Accordingly, on 31 March 1995, 24 military observers in the team concluded their mission. Fourteen of them have left Haiti and the remaining ten have been incorporated into the general headquarters staff of the military component of UNMIH.

31. In compliance with usual practice, negotiations were held with the Government of Haiti to ensure that UNMIH will enjoy full freedom of movement and communication, as well as other rights necessary for the performance of its tasks. These negotiations concluded successfully, and on 15 March my Special

Representative and the Minister For Foreign Affairs of Haiti signed a status-of-forces agreement for UNMIH.

VIII. DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

A. Headquarters

32. The Mission has established its headquarters in Port-au-Prince and sub-headquarters in six operational sectors (Cap Haïtien, Gonaïves, Port-au-Prince (2), Jacmel and Les Cayes). Five infantry battalions (including the Quick Reaction Force), support units, a military police battalion, an engineering unit, aviation and logistic elements, a military information support team and a civil affairs unit are deployed in 10 locations (Cap Haïtien, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, Gonaïves, Port-de-Paix, St. Marc, Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, Les Cayes, Jérémie). Special Forces elements are deployed throughout the country in 25 locations. As at 31 March 1995, the Mission had 122 out of 220 international civilian staff, 175 out of 240 local staff and 12 out of 29 United Nations Volunteers. Approximately two thirds of the military and one third of the civilian police components of UNMIH have come from the multinational force.

B. Military components

33. On 31 March 1995, military contingents from Bangladesh (a battalion of 1,050), the CARICOM countries (a battalion of 277), Guatemala (a company of 120), Nepal (a battalion of 410) and the United States (a force of 2,336) were transferred from the multinational force to UNMIH. The total strength of the military contingents of UNMIH transferred from the multinational force is 4,193.

34. Beginning on 15 March 1995, military contingents from Canada (various units totalling 484), Honduras (a company of 117), India (a military police company of 120), the Netherlands (a company of 142) and Pakistan (a battalion of 850) arrived in the Mission area. The total strength of these newly arrived contingents is 1,713. Still scheduled to arrive are contingents from Argentina (15) and Suriname (36).

C. Civilian police

35. The CIVPOL advance team had begun deployment on 27 December 1994 throughout the country. Small teams were sent to Jérémie, Les Cayes, Cap Haïtien, Gonaïves and Jacmel. Preparations were made to identify and secure office accommodations, make contacts with the communities, establish liaison with the multinational force and meet with other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. In February, additional personnel were deployed to these locations and those where early transition was to occur. On 14 March 1995, an early transition from the international police monitors to the CIVPOL component of UNMIH started in five locations: Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Gonaïves, Les Cayes and Jérémie. The main difficulty has been the deployment of CIVPOL contingents, owing to changes in the schedule of arrivals

from the contributing countries, the shortage of vehicles and delays in establishing the communications system.

36. Prior to the 31 March transition, 379 police personnel from Argentina (64), Bangladesh (85), Benin (34), Jordan (146) and the Philippines (50) were transferred from international police monitors deployed with the multinational force to the CIVPOL component of UNMIH. Beginning on 15 March, CIVPOL personnel from Algeria, Austria, Barbados, Canada, Djibouti, France, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nepal, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saint Kitts, Suriname and Togo arrived in Haiti, bringing the strength of the CIVPOL component to 791.

37. Additional CIVPOL personnel from Argentina (38), Dominica (5), France (25), Grenada (10), Nepal (12), Pakistan (4) and Saint Lucia (9) are expected to arrive in the course of April, bringing the strength of UNMIH CIVPOL to the authorized level.

D. Camps

38. With respect to camp construction, the priority until 31 March 1995 was to survey, locate and enter into contractual status all property and land required for Mission headquarters, MICIVIH and CIVPOL regional offices and military campsites.

39. Alteration work on the main headquarters was completed by mid-March, which enabled the principal civilian and military staff to move to their permanent location before the transition. The CIVPOL metropolitan office building in Port-au-Prince is fully operational. CIVPOL plans to have offices in 15 locations throughout the country.

40. Four military camps constructed by the multinational force in Port-au-Prince were taken over on 31 March 1995. Cap Haïtien has three camps built by the multinational force, two of which were taken over on 1 April 1995. There will be a further eight camps throughout the country. They will be constructed by the engineering battalion of UNMIH and should be completed by 20 June 1995.

E. Deployment and operations

41. At the beginning of the operation, the military component of UNMIH plans to accomplish its mission by positioning conventional forces in Port-au-Prince, Cap Haïtien, Jacmel and Gonaïves and by stationing Special Forces units throughout the country, as had been done by the multinational force. UNMIH will then gradually expand its presence in each of the operational zones by deploying conventional forces to base camps that will be constructed throughout the country and by actively patrolling from the base camps to ensure that the local governmental, social, and economic institutions can operate unhindered. By providing such an environment, UNMIH will help ensure the security necessary for free and fair elections. The military component will work closely with CIVPOL, the local Haitian authorities and population, the Interim Public Security Force, the new permanent National Police Force, the media, United Nations agencies and

others to coordinate efforts and assist the Government of Haiti in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment. Throughout its mission, UNMIH will employ public information personnel, military information support teams and civil affairs resources to their fullest advantage.

42. Coordination between the military and CIVPOL components of UNMIH has been excellent, especially since the two components moved to the new headquarters building, where they have been able to co-locate their operations centres and where the two commanders concerned have their offices. Daily briefings enable the military personnel to benefit from information gathered by the CIVPOL officers deployed throughout Haiti. In the brief time since the transition from the multinational force, these arrangements have already proven to be of high value.

43. As agreed by the Commanders of CIVPOL and the military component in February, a joint Criminal Information Analysis Team was established on 31 March. The members of the team work together in collecting criminal information from the various reports coming from the field, analysing crime trends, developing threat assessments and providing forecasts.

44. The CIVPOL component of UNMIH is also working in coordination with the Department of Investigation and Research of MICIVIH. In view of its familiarity with the political and social environment in Haiti, MICIVIH is providing information and orientation concerning the human rights situation.

45. Among the difficulties which the CIVPOL component has encountered is the fact that the number of interpreters it can employ is limited by budgetary factors. This restriction may affect its operations since several large contingents, which are to provide on-the-job training to French and Creole-speaking personnel, have very little competence in French. The training package to be used is also in French.

IX. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

46. The General Assembly, by its resolution 49/239 of 31 March 1995, decided to appropriate to the Special Account a total amount of $151,545,100 gross ($149,579,700 net) for the operation of the Mission for the period from 1 February to 31 July 1995, inclusive of the amount of $3,720,700 gross ($3,409,600 net) authorized by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the period from 1 to 28 February 1995 under the terms of Assembly resolution 48/229.

47. With regard to the period beyond 31 July 1995, I have been authorized, on a provisional basis, to enter into commitments at a monthly rate not to exceed $21,202,240 gross ($20,840,040 net) for the three-month period from 1 August to 31 October 1995 in connection with the maintenance of the Mission.

X. OBSERVATIONS

48. The transfer of responsibilities from the multinational force to UNMIH on 31 March 1995 was a milestone in the overall efforts of the international community to bring peace and stability to Haiti. The success achieved by the multinational force in the restoration of the legitimate Government of Haiti and the careful, detailed planning for the assumption of responsibilities by UNMIH give reason to hope that this United Nations operation, notwithstanding the broader scope of its mandate, will be successful. To achieve its goals, it will need the full cooperation of the Government of Haiti. Much depends, in this regard, on the people of Haiti and their leaders. They know that work, determination and patience are needed to rehabilitate their nation's institutions and economy.

49. The state of the Haitian economy is, of course, immensely important. It will be a critical test of the success - or otherwise - of the whole process which is now unfolding. Although economic development is not part of the mandate of UNMIH, the Mission will, where possible, assist in the implementation of development activities. In this context, Mr. Cristián Ossa has been appointed Deputy Special Representative and concurrently Resident Representative for the United Nations Development Programme. This is the first time that the United Nations has linked a peace-keeping mission to development activities in this manner. It will promote closer cooperation between all concerned and will facilitate the transition from UNMIH to continuing peace-building activities by the United Nations in accordance with the established procedures for the coordination of operational activities for development.

50. In accordance with the mandate established in resolution 940 (1994), a fully deployed UNMIH will be able to provide the assistance the Haitian authorities require to carry out their tasks, particularly during the election campaign. In this regard, the establishment of the new Haitian police and the rehabilitation of the judicial system remain crucial both for maintenance of a secure environment and for the consolidation of democracy, respect for human rights and an end to impunity.

51. I should like to stress that UNMIH has signalled to those who might be tempted to try to prevent the Mission from accomplishing its mandate that it will react swiftly and firmly to any attempt to foment instability. The departure of the multinational force and lower UNMIH troop levels should not be perceived by such elements as an opportunity to resume their previous activities.

52. In this context, it must be noted that hostility to the presence of a foreign military force is sometimes expressed in Haiti. However, there is no evidence of any immediate threat to the international presence or to the Government of Haiti. The assertive policy of UNMIH is intended to discourage anyone inclined to cause trouble. The Mission will also continue to provide security for humanitarian relief convoys.

53. Last but not least, I would like to repeat the call I made in Port-au-Prince for everyone in Haiti to help UNMIH help the Haitian people. I would like to tell them again that the international community has the resolve

to help Haiti move forward towards peace, national reconciliation and economic recovery. UNMIH, for its part, has the means and the determination to carry out its mission, which is to help the Government provide security and create the conditions that will allow it to maintain law and order without external support.

54. I would like to remind the political leaders and the people of Haiti that security is not assured by the gun alone. Security requires dialogue, tolerance, cooperation and reconciliation; it needs a national political consensus. Elections should be seen as a step to achieve that consensus. Successful elections will create stable institutions, and stable institutions will enhance security. And finally, stable institutions and enhanced security will allow economic and social development in a country that has been plagued by poverty, unrest and violence.

55. In concluding this first report on UNMIH, I should like to commend my Special Representative, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, for his willing acceptance of his complex responsibilities. I am certain that with the able assistance of the Force Commander, General J. Kinzer, the CIVPOL Commander, Chief Superintendent N. Pouliot, and the dedicated men and women in the civilian, police and military components of the Mission, he will succeed in guiding it to the attainment of its goals.

Annex I

Composition and strength of the military component of the United Nations Mission in Haiti as at 10 April 1995

	Military contingents	Force headquarters	
Antigua and Barbuda	15	1	
Bangladesh	1 050	22	
Bahamas	36	1	
Barbados	24	-	
Canada	474	26	
Djibouti	-	7	
France	-	2	
Guatemala	120	4	
Guyana	51	-	
Honduras	117	3	
India	120	3	
Ireland	-	2	
Jamaica	101	2	
Nepal	410	4	
Netherlands	142	4	
Pakistan	850	18	
Trinidad and Tobago	55	1	
United States of America	2 290	62	
Total	5 855	162	
Grand total			6 017

Annex II

Composition and strength of the civilian police component of the United Nations Mission in Haiti as at 10 April 1995

Algeria	15
Argentina	63
Austria	20
Bangladesh	85
Barbados	10
Benin	35
Canada	100
Djibouti	15
France	70
Guinea-Bissau	20
Jordan	146
Mali	25
Nepal	41
Pakistan	48
Philippines	50
Russian Federation	5
Saint Kitts	8
Suriname	15
Togo	20
Total	791



Map No. 3888 UNITED NATIONS
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